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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Scott Demint appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In its published opinion affirming Demint’s convictions on direct appeal, the Idaho Court
of Appeals described the underlying facts and proceedings as follows:
Two officers were patrolling westbound Interstate 84. One officer had a
drug detection dog. The officers received information that Demint and a
passenger would be traveling in a maroon Ford F–150 truck and potentially had
methamphetamine. The officers observed the vehicle and stopped it for two
traffic infractions: speeding and failing to use a turn signal properly. The truck
had an extended passenger compartment and the truck bed was enclosed with a
camper shell. One officer approached the truck and asked for Demint’s driver’s
license and registration. While one officer ran the information, the canine officer
deployed his drug dog. The drug dog alerted at the open driver’s side window of
the passenger compartment. The officer directed the dog into the passenger
compartment but the drug dog failed to alert inside. The officer did not manually
search the passenger compartment. The officer then took the drug dog to the back
of the truck, opened up the camper shell, and had the drug dog jump inside the
enclosed bed. The drug dog alerted inside the enclosed bed near a green bag and
a first aid kit. The officer searched but did not find anything in the green bag.
The officer put the drug dog back in the patrol car, resumed his search, and found
methamphetamine, oxycodone, marijuana, and approximately $12,000 in cash in
the first aid kit.
Demint was arrested and charged with four felony offenses: trafficking in
methamphetamine; possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to deliver;
unlawful possession of a firearm; and possession of a controlled substance. He
was also charged with two misdemeanors: possession of a controlled substance
and paraphernalia. The State also alleged Demint was a persistent violator.
Demint moved to suppress the evidence and joined in the issues raised in his codefendant’s motion to suppress, arguing: (1) the stop of his vehicle was invalid;
(2) the warrantless search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution and under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution; (3) the search was not performed pursuant to any exception to the
warrant requirement; and (4) there was no probable cause to search the enclosed
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bed because the drug dog’s initial alert only provided probable cause to search the
passenger compartment.
After a hearing, the district court denied Demint’s joint motion to suppress
and found the officer had probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including
the enclosed bed. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Demint conditionally pled guilty
to trafficking in methamphetamine, Idaho Code §§ 37–2732B(a)(4)(C), 18–204,
and unlawful possession of a firearm, I.C. § 18–3316, reserving his right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The State agreed to dismiss
the remaining charges. The district court imposed a unified twenty-year sentence,
with ten years determinate, for trafficking in methamphetamine, and a consecutive
five-year sentence, with two and one-half years determinate, for unlawful
possession of a firearm, to be served consecutively.
State v. Demint, 161 Idaho 231, 232-233, 384 P.3d 995, 996-997 (Ct. App. 2016).
On direct appeal, Demint argued that any probable cause from the drug dog’s initial alert
dissipated when the dog failed to alert inside the passenger compartment, and that the officers’
warrantless search was unlawful after that point. Id. at 233, 384 P.3d at 997. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court after concluding that Demint failed to preserve this argument
for appeal. Id. at 233-234, 384 P.3d at 997-998.
In January 2017, Demint filed a pro se post-conviction petition in which he raised
numerous claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel in filing and arguing the
motion to suppress.

(R., pp.6-31.)

appointment of counsel.

The district court granted Demint’s motion for the

(R., pp.37-38.)

However, appointed counsel declined to amend
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Demint’s petition. 1 (See generally R.) The state filed a motion for summary dismissal (R.,
pp.57-72), to which Demint did not file a response (See generally R).
In August 2017, the district court filed a notice of intent to summarily dismiss Demint’s
post-conviction petition. (R., pp.160-171.) The district court did not rely upon or reference the
grounds set forth in the state’s motion for summary dismissal, and instead set forth its own sua
sponte grounds for dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (Id.) With respect to the portion of
Demint’s post-conviction petition asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the court
construed Demint’s petition as asserting that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) filing a motion
to suppress that was unduly short and bereft of any actual recitation, legal argument, and legal
points and authorities; (2) failing to investigate applicable cases in preparing the suppression
motion; (3) failing to argue that law enforcement should have obtained a warrant after the drug
canine alerted on the vehicle; (4) failing to challenge the legality of the stop; (5) failing to
procure an expert to challenge the drug canine’s training and to explain constitutional law to the
court; and (6) failing to explain applicable law to the district court, such as the definition of
probable cause, the procedural process for a search warrant, the unconstitutionality of a
warrantless search, and the requirement of a drug recognition expert to obtain a search warrant
after the canine alerted.

(R., pp.167-169.)

The court concluded that Demint failed to

demonstrate he was entitled to relief on any of these claims as a matter of law and/or that the

1

Approximately two months after the state filed its motion for summary dismissal, and before
the district court entered its notice of intent to dismiss, Demint’s appointed counsel filed a
motion for a stay of the proceedings and for leave to amend the post-conviction petition. (R.,
pp.149-156.) The motion included evidence related to posted speed limits in the area where
Demint was stopped, which, Demint asserted, demonstrated that he was not speeding at the time
he was pulled over. (Id.) However, the district court denied the motion on the grounds that it
was untimely pursuant to its previously-entered scheduling order (see R., pp.48-49), because
Demint failed to demonstrate good cause for the late filing, and because the exhibits would not
have altered the court’s decision on the underlying motion to suppress (R., pp.157-159).
3

claims were disproven by the record. (Id.) The court provided Demint 20 days from the date of
the order to reply to the grounds of dismissal set forth in the notice. (R., p.170.)
Demint did not file a response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss, or seek
leave to amend the petition to clarify his claims in light of the grounds set forth by the court.
(See R., p.173.)

Thirty days after entering its notice, the district court entered an order

summarily dismissing Demint’s petition.

(R., pp.172-185.) The court dismissed Demint’s

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, along with Demint’s entire post-conviction petition,
on grounds identical to those set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.179-181.)
Demint timely appealed. (R., pp.186-188.)

4

ISSUE
Demint states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by dismissing one of Mr. Demint’s postconviction claims because the district court failed to give any notice of its reason
for dismissal?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Demint failed to demonstrate that the district court provided inadequate notice of its
grounds for dismissal of any of Demint’s post-conviction claims?
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ARGUMENT
Demint Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Provided Inadequate Notice Of Its
Grounds For Dismissal Of Any Of Demint’s Post-Conviction Claims
A.

Introduction
Demint contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing one of his post-

conviction claims without providing notice. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) Specifically,
Demint contends that the district court did not provide him notice of the basis for dismissal of his
purported claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue, in the motion to
suppress, that the officers unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop. (Id.)
Demint has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred. First, Demint’s petition,
which was lengthy and difficult to decipher, did not “specifically set forth” this claim as required
by I.C. § 19-4903 in a manner which would have required the district court to identify it in its
notice of intent and/or dismissal order. Next, even assuming that Demint’s post-conviction
petition actually contained this claim, the district court properly provided Demint with more than
20 days to respond to its notice of intent to dismiss before summarily dismissing the entire
petition on grounds identical to those set forth in the notice. Finally, even if the district court
erred by failing to recognize that Demint’s petition contained a distinct ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim related to a failure to challenge the duration of the traffic stop, any such error
was harmless because the claim clearly fails as a matter of law.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s application of the

Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967,
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968 (2001). The interpretation of a statute is also a question of law subject to free review. State
v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 539 (2012).

C.

The District Court Provided Adequate Notice Before Dismissing Demint’s PostConviction Petition
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent
civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to
relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104
Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Idaho Code § 19-4903 requires a post-conviction
petitioner to, among other things, “specifically set forth the grounds upon which the
application is based, and clearly state the relief desired.” Further, “[i]t is clearly established
under Idaho law that a cause of action not raised in a party’s pleadings may not be considered on
summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal.” Kelly v. State, 149
Idaho 517, 523-524, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283-1284 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110-111, 15 P.3d 820, 823-824 (2000) (district
court did not err in summarily dismissing post-conviction petition without considering claims
neither alleged in the original petition, nor properly before the court in an amended petition filed
without leave of the court).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant
“has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d
738, 739 (1998).

Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
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application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on its own
initiative, a petitioner is entitled to notice of the basis for the dismissal, and 20 days to respond.
I.C. § 19-4906(b). “A notice of intent to dismiss must state the reasons for dismissal in order to
provide an applicant with meaningful opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence
that may demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue.” Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533,
537, 82 P.3d 445, 450 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011).
The Court’s “goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the purpose of the statute
and the legislative intent in enacting it.” Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155
Idaho 853, 859, 318 P.3d 622, 628 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). “If the statutory language
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and
there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. This is because the
asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.” Idaho Youth
Ranch, Inc. v. Ada County Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 185, 335 P.3d 25, 30 (2014)
(citations and internal quotation omitted).
1.

Demint’s Post-Conviction Petition Did Not Allege That His Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The Duration Of The Traffic Stop

As noted above, Idaho Code § 19-4903 requires a post-conviction petitioner to, among
other things, “specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based.” In this
8

case, Demint’s post-conviction petition did not specifically allege that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue, in the motion to suppress, that the officers unlawfully
extended the duration of the traffic stop.

The district court therefore did not err by

dismissing Demint’s entire petition without specifically addressing or providing notice for
the dismissal of such a claim.
On appeal, Demint quotes excerpts from three different portions of the post-conviction
petition in an attempt to cobble together a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the officers’ extension of the traffic stop. (Appellant’s brief, pp.2, 8-9.) A review of
the context of these three portions of the petition,2 and the petition as a whole, reveals that such a
claim was not raised in compliance with I.C § 19-4903, and that the district court therefore did
not err in the manner in which it construed the petition.
Demint’s post-conviction petition is lengthy and difficult to decipher. (See R., pp.6-31.)
It is written in a continuous narrative format and does not clearly or specifically identify most of
his claims with headings or enumeration. (See id.) Thus, the district court was left to wade
through the text of the petition to attempt to construe Demint’s claims. In the first portion of the
petition quoted in Demint’s Appellant’s brief, under a heading entitled, “Counsel failed to have
knowledge of existing law” (R., p.16), Demint made the following assertions:
In this instance the Petitioner[’]s counsel failed to use any existing case
law, which set a standard, in this matter. [Trial Counsel] never argued that
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio that this was a routine traffic stop and should have been
treated as such. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). If law enforcement had
information to effect a search then they should have used that procedural process
instead of utilize a traffic stop, in order to initiate a narcotics search. In this case
law enforcement used the traffic stop for that sole purpose. This violated the
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment [rights]. The stop[’]s only tolerable duration is
determined by the seizure’s “mission” which is to address the traffic infraction
2

In order to provide this context, the state quotes from somewhat longer passages of the petition
than Demint did in his Appellant’s brief.
9

that warranted the stop, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 [2005], and attend
to related safety concerns.
Deputies used a drug sniff dog only after Deputy Lowry was advised by
undercover Agents and Detective Roberson. The stop was not predicated on a
meer [sic] traffic stop, but on a confidential informant[’]s tips. This stop was used
purposely for searching the vehicle. Defense Counsel should have argued that
first if the confidential informant[’]s tip was credible then law enforcement should
have obtained a warrant. Instead, they used a traffic stop to search the vehicle.
Once the drug sniff dog “Nana” indicated on the vehicle, Deputy Lowry should
have obtained a search warrant via a telephonic warrant. Nina’s indication is only
assessed by the court as probable cause. Therefore as in a blood draw, based on a
drug recognition expert’s training and experience, that officer has to obtain a
search warrant or warrant to obtain blood. The court[’]s dual standard upsets the
balance of justice.
(R., pp.18-19 (some citations modified).)
While the petition thus referenced the duration of the traffic stop, Demint’s primary
contentions in this portion of the petition appear to be: (1) his trial counsel did not adequately
support his motion to suppress with caselaw; and (2) his trial counsel should have argued that the
pretextual nature of the officers’ stop required them to obtain a warrant before searching his
vehicle. The district court construed Demint’s petition as containing both of these claims and
provided notice for its grounds for dismissal of them. (R., pp.167-168.)
In the second portion of the petition quoted in Demint’s Appellant’s brief, under a
heading entitled, “Petitioner’s conviction was obtained on the basis of evidence obtained as the
result of an illegal search and seizure” (R., p.22), Demint set forth various legal principles
including the following:
A routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry than an arrest,
see e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). Its tolerable duration is
determined by the seizure’s “mission” which is to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407[,] and attend to related safety
concerns. Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction
are – or reasonably should have been – completed. The Fourth Amendment may
tolerate certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen the roadside
detention, Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327-328; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406, but a traffic
10

stop “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonable required
to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a warning ticket, Id.
(R., pp.22-24 (some citations modified).)
While Demint thus cited caselaw relevant to a traffic stop duration analysis, he did not go
on to specifically allege that the officers unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop in
this case. Instead, several pages later, in the third portion of the petition quoted in Demint’s
Appellant’s brief, still under the heading asserting an “illegal search and seizure,” Demint
continued to allege that the pretextual nature of the stop required officers to obtain an
“anticipatory search warrant” prior to searching Demint’s vehicle, and that the warrantless search
was thus unlawful from the very beginning:
In this instance, Deputy Lowry was acting on a narcotics tip from a
Detective Roberson. The traffic stop was predicated upon this fact. This was the
only “mission” of the traffic stop. Detective Roberson’s failure to secure an
anticipatory search warrant based on the information obtained from the
[confidential informant] was fundamentally a manifest error. Detective Roberson
knew that his evidence to obtain a search warrant was insufficient, so he and other
Detectives, as well as Deputy Lowry and [Sgt.] Clifford utilized a traffic stop to
initiate a warrantless search. This violated due process of law in that, law
enforcement, subverted the judicial process to effect an unlawful search. This
action violates both Article 1 Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment[s] of the United States Constitution.
Next, we have the alleged narcotics indication by Nina. When Nina was
walked around the outside of the vehicle she indicated on the open window.
Regardless of whether Nina indicated this is only probable cause to suspect
narcotics. There is still no credible evidence, and Deputy Lowry should have
ascertained [sic] a search warrant which would have been predicated on that
indication. However, Deputy Lowry failed to do that. He initiated a warrantless
search. Petitioner asserts that Deputy Lowry’s intent was not the traffic stop or
the welfare of the occupants, which is indicated in Terry, 392 U.S. 1, so in short,
there is no objectionable or subjective means of determining, that had it been a
different officer the same exact situation would have occurred.
The court must acknowledge that a police stop which exceeds the time
needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the
constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a
police-observed traffic violation, therefore, “become[s] unlawful if it prolonged
11

beyond the time reasonable required to compete th[e] mission” of issuing a traffic
ticket for the violation. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. Petitioner asserts that there
would not have been any “reasonable suspicion” of any crime had the traffic stop
been only for a traffic violation. Therefore when officers obtained information, in
which, they they [sic] through prior knowledge are going to search a vehicle they
should have secured through the judicial process a search warrant. The failure to
do so violates due process and invalidates the search and seizure of the
Petitioner[’]s vehicle.
(R., pp.28-30 (some citations modified).)
The district court reasonably construed these and related portions of Demint’s petition as
asserting that Demint’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the officers were
required to obtain a search warrant prior to commencing their search of the vehicle. (R., p.168.)
The court summarily dismissed this claim, concluding:
Demint takes issue with [trial counsel’s] failure to argue that law
enforcement should have obtained a warrant to search the vehicle after Nina
alerted on the vehicle. To this end, Demint demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of criminal procedure. As the Court indicated in its verbal
ruling, a drug-detection canine can provide an officer with probable cause to
search an automobile without a warrant. When a reliable drug-detection dog
indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled
substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the
automobile and may search it without a warrant. Therefore, had [trial counsel]
made the argument advanced by Demint, it would have been futile.
In addition, Demint’s argument is contrary to the record. [Trial counsel]
did assert – contrary to well settled case law – that the warrantless search of the
first aid kit was unlawful because it was a closed container in the bed of the truck,
and therefore, subject to privacy interests. The Court properly rejected this
argument, noting that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows
law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches [of] any container
within the car if the container could reasonably contain the suspected contraband
or evidence. For these reasons, Demint’s claim for relief is subject to summary
dismissal.
(Id. (emphasis in original, citations and internal quotation omitted).)
It was Demint’s burden to “specifically set forth the grounds upon which” his postconviction petition was based. I.C. § 19-4903; see also Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 877
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n.2, 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 n.2 (Ct. App. 2008) (“We note that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be individually pled with specificity. All too often, both in the district court and
on appeal, counsel attempts to use one broad category such as ‘failure to investigate’ as a spring
board to raise any argument they wish as ‘part and parcel’ of the claim. Such a practice is
strongly discouraged.”). Having failed to specifically allege, in his post-conviction petition, an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim regarding the duration of the traffic stop, Demint
cannot successfully claim on appeal that the district court erred in failing to identify or provide
notice for the dismissal of this claim. 3
2.

In The Alternative, Demint Was Provided Adequate Notice For The Dismissal Of
His Entire Post-Conviction Petition

Even assuming that Demint properly raised a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue that the officers unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop, he has
still failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief because the district court provided adequate
notice for the dismissal of Demint’s entire post-conviction petition.
Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) requires district courts to provide post-conviction petitioners an
“opportunity” to reply within 20 days of a notice of intent to summarily dismiss a postconviction petition. In this case, Demint received such an opportunity. The district court
summarily dismissed Demint’s entire petition 30 days after it entered its notice of intent to
dismiss. (R., pp.160-184.) The dismissal order was substantially identical to the notice of intent

3

The state further notes that while, generally, a pro se post-conviction petition must be read
“keep[ing] in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be
conclusory and incomplete,” Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001)
(superseded by statute on other grounds), in this case, Demint should not be entitled to such
deference because he was represented by counsel throughout the post-conviction proceeding.
See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 302 (Pa. 1999) (“We will not require courts
considering [post-conviction] petitions to struggle through pro se filings of defendants when
qualified counsel represent those defendants.”).
13

to dismiss, both in terms of the grounds for dismissal, and the manner in which the court
identified and construed the claims in Demint’s petition. (Id.)

Demint did not respond to the

district court’s notice of intent to dismiss. (See R., p.173.)
The state acknowledges that in Garza, 139 Idaho at 536-537, 82 P.3d at 448-449
(overruled on other grounds), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is
not barred from appealing an I.C. § 19-4906(b) post-conviction dismissal order on the ground of
lack of notice when the petitioner fails to respond to the district court’s notice of intent to
dismiss. 4 This holding was based upon a review of the legislative history which indicated that
the legislators “viewed the 20-day reply period as an opportunity to submit an amended
application, not as a requirement to receiving a ruling on the merits of an application,” and that
nothing in the Report to the Idaho Legislature regarding I.C. § 19-4906(b) limited appeals to
petitioners who replied to the notice of intent to dismiss. Id. at 537, 82 P.3d at 449. Therefore,
in Garza, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s summary dismissal of four postconviction claims for which the district court did not provide, in its notice of intent to dismiss,
the grounds for dismissal. Id. at 537-538, 82 P.3d at 449-450.
However, it is not clear from Garza whether the district court specifically identified those
four claims in its notice but failed to provide the grounds for which the claims would later be
dismissed; or, if the district court did not construe Garza’s petition as containing those specific
claims at all. The state submits that in the latter scenario, as in the present case, where a
4

Where the notice of the grounds for the dismissal of a post-conviction claim come not from a
district court’s notice of intent to dismiss (pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b)), but from a state’s
motion for summary dismissal (pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c)), the Idaho Supreme Court has held
that a post-conviction petitioner may raise, for the first time on appeal, a claim that he was
deprived of any notice of the grounds for dismissal, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521-522
(2010), but that a post-conviction petitioner may not raise, for the first time on appeal, a claim
that he was deprived of sufficient notice, DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601-602, 200 P.3d
1148, 1150-1151 (2009).
14

petitioner receives notice from the court of the manner in which the petition is to be construed,
and then fails to respond to the notice, he cannot later claim on appeal that the district court erred
in the manner in which it construed the petition’s claims.
While a post-conviction petitioner may not be able to ascertain whether he or she
received inadequate notice of the summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim until the claim is
actually dismissed (and thus could not necessarily be expected to raise such an issue until that
point), a petitioner is put on notice, at the time of the district court’s entry of its notice of intent
to dismiss, how the court has construed the petitioner’s claims.

In such an instance, the

petitioner should not be permitted, for the first time on appeal, to raise issues relating to the
manner in which the district court construed the petition. Further, as recognized in Garza, the
entire purpose of the required 20-day notice period is to provide the petitioner an opportunity to
file an amended petition after the district court has presented its proposed grounds for the
dismissal of an existing petition. Id. at 537, 82 P.3d at 449. Such an amended petition, or other
manner of clarification, would give the district court an opportunity to make a specific
appealable ruling on a claim whose existence may reasonably not have been apparent to it.
Further, the plain language of I.C. § 19-4906(b) provides only for an “opportunity” to respond to
the grounds for dismissal of a petition within 20 days. There can be no question that the district
court’s notice of intent to dismiss put Demint on notice that it intended to dismiss his petition in
its entirety, on the bases set forth in the notice. It was incumbent upon Demint to alert the court,
upon receiving this notice, that the court had misperceived or omitted one of his claims. Because
he failed to do so, Demint has failed to show any basis for reversal.
Should this Court choose to vacate the district court’s dismissal order and remand the
case, it would simply be providing Demint a second opportunity to respond to the district court’s
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notice of intent to dismiss. This is one more opportunity than Demint is entitled to under Idaho
law. “The loss to a petitioner who does not respond to the 20-day notice of intent to dismiss is
that he or she loses the opportunity to cure a defect in an application before the district court
which might have resulted in a favorable ruling from the district court or presented an adequate
record for a valid appeal.” Garza, 139 Idaho at 537, 82 P.2d at 449.
3.

Any Error Was Harmless

A district court’s error in failing to address a particular claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel does not require reversal if the error was harmless. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 421,
128 P.3d 948, 958 (Ct. App. 2005); Gomez v. State, 120 Idaho 632, 634, 818 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.
1991); I.R.C.P. 61.

As noted above, the purpose of providing notice in a post-conviction

proceeding is to allow the petitioner the opportunity to address and cure defects in his pleadings.
See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 323, 900 P.2d 795, 799 (1995).

This Court

“employs the same standards on appellate review that the trial court applies in considering
summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief.” Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,
676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010). Where the petition would ultimately be subject to summary
dismissal regardless of the adequacy of notice, because the defects in the pleadings are not
curable or otherwise, the failure to give notice is harmless error. In this case, even assuming the
district court erred by not construing Demint’s petition as containing a claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for declining to challenge the duration of the traffic stop, and that Demint was
therefore deprived of adequate notice of the dismissal of the entire petition, any such error was
harmless because the claim clearly fails as a matter of law.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in a post-conviction
petition, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the
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petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688
(1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174,
1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id.
at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Where the alleged deficiency is trial counsel’s failure to file a motion,
a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court is
generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,
512, 988 P.2d 1170, 1186 (1999).
In this case, even assuming that Demint’s petition contained a claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to argue that the officers unlawfully extended the duration of his
traffic stop, such a claim clearly fails as a matter of law. First, to the extent such a claim was
raised at all, it was vague and conclusory. While, as noted above, Demint cited some caselaw
relevant to analysis of the lawful duration of a traffic stop, he did not specifically argue how the
officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop in this case, that a motion to suppress on this basis
would have been successful, or that his counsel’s decision not to pursue such an argument was
based upon some objective shortcoming. (See R., pp.6-31.) Demint’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim thus clearly fails as a matter of law, and any error by the district court is harmless.
Further, even if Demint’s petition is more liberally construed, a review of the record
clearly reveals that the officers did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop. Under the Fourth
Amendment, an investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must also
be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in duration to the circumstances which
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justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State
v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004). “The purpose of a stop is not
permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is initiated, for during the course of the
detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which initially prompted
the stop.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984, 88 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation
omitted).
Further, while “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is
determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ – to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop,
and attend to related safety concerns,” this “mission” also includes “ordinary inquiries incident to
[the traffic] stop,” such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance.” Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-1615 (2015)
(citations omitted).
It is well-settled that law enforcement may deploy a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a
lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong
the detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-184, 125 P.3d 536, 539-540 (Ct.
App. 2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000).
Moreover, a canine sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating the Fourth
Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if any extension of the stop is justified
by reasonable suspicion. State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424, 361 P.3d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App.
2015). A positive alert by a drug dog provides probable cause to search a vehicle pursuant to the
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automobile exception to the warrant requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572
(1991); State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 875, 172 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Ct. App. 2007).
In this case, officers stopped Demint for committing two traffic violations. Demint, 161
Idaho at 232, 384 P.3d at 996. While one officer made contact with Demint, obtained his
relevant information, and ran it through dispatch, another officer deployed a drug dog around
Demint’s vehicle. Id. (see also R., pp.103-104, 5 p.173 n.5.) The drug dog alerted near the open
driver’s side window. Id. (see also R., p.104.) At this point, the officers had probable cause to
search the entire vehicle. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572; Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 875, 172 P.3d at
1150. The officers searched the vehicle and located contraband. Demint, 161 Idaho at 232, 384
P.3d at 996.
Because the officers obtained probable cause to search Demint’s vehicle while
investigating Demint’s traffic violations and obtaining his relevant vehicle documents, the
officers did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop by searching Demint’s vehicle. Any attempt
by his trial counsel to suppress evidence on this basis would have been unsuccessful. Therefore,
any error committed by the district court in failing to identify or give notice for the dismissal of
such a claim is harmless.

5

The district court took judicial notice of the transcripts from Demint’s underlying criminal case
(including the transcript of the suppression hearing), Demint’s motion to suppress, and minutes
from a hearing that was not transcribed. (R., p.173 n.3.) Most of these documents are contained
in the clerk’s appellate record in this case. (R., pp.73-140.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Demint’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 30th day of July, 2018.
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